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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jevon Goff contends the district court erred by forcing him to be present when the jury
venire entered the courtroom for the first time even though Mr. Goff had repeatedly expressed
his desire to waive his right to be present at trial.
The State has effectively conceded the abuse of discretion in this case by conceding a
defendant can decide to be voluntarily absent after the trial starts and by not responding to, and
thus, waiving response to, Mr. Goff’s point that the trial starts when the court calls the case to
order. Since Mr. Goff renewed his request to be absent after the court called the case to order on
the morning of trial, per the State’s concession, the district court abused its discretion by
requiring his continued presence when the venire panel subsequently entered the courtroom.
The remainder of the State’s arguments do not change that conclusion, since those
arguments run contrary to the applicable United States Supreme Court precedents. Either way,
this Court should remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Goff’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by forcing Mr. Goff to be present when the jury
venire entered the courtroom despite his desire to waive his right to be present during the trial.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forcing Mr. Goff To Be Present When The Jury
Venire Entered The Courtroom Despite His Desire To Waive His Right To Be Present During
The Trial

A.

The State’s Has Effectively Conceded The Abuse Of Discretion In This Case By Not
Responding To The Point That Mr. Goff Renewed His Request To Be Absent After The
Court Called The Case To Order, And Thus, After The Trial Started
The State conceded that I.C.R. 43(c)(1)(A) provides an exception to the defendant’s

required presence if he desires to be voluntarily absent after the trial has begun. (Resp. Br., p.7
(admitting that section “applies after the trial has begun, at which point a defendant may be
voluntarily absent”) (internal quotations omitted).) That concession should end the discussion in
this case because, as Mr. Goff pointed out in his Appellant’s Brief, the trial “begins” when the
judge calls the case to order on the morning of trial, not when the jury venire enters the
courtroom. (App. Br., p.10 (citing, inter alia, Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir.
2000) (explaining this is an alternative issue to the question of whether a defendant can waive his
right to be present despite the rule’s general requirements).)

The State did not offer any

argument on that point. (See generally Resp. Br.) As such, the State has waived any response in
that regard, and thus, effectively conceded that the trial had started before Mr. Goff made his
request on the morning of trial. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
Therefore, since Mr. Goff renewed his request to be voluntarily absent from the trial after
the district court called the case to order on the morning of trial, and thus, after the trial started
(see Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.3-5), his request to be voluntarily absent before the jury venire entered the
courtroom fell squarely, per the State’s concession, within the exception in I.C.R. 43(c)(1)(A).
As such, the district court’s conclusion – that Mr. Goff’s presence was required when the jury
venire entered the courtroom (Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.6-7) – was an abuse of discretion because it
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neither appreciated the outer limits of its discretion nor confirmed with the applicable legal
standards.1 As such, this Court should provide relief for that essentially-conceded abuse of the
district court’s discretion.

B.

The State’s Remaining Arguments Run Directly Contrary To The Relevant United States
Supreme Court Precedent
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear that its holding in

Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993), has limited precedential value beyond the
specific situation it was addressing – whether the court may start a trial when the defendant has
fled the jurisdiction. In Crosby itself, the Supreme Court expressly declared its analysis would
not extend to cases such as Mr. Goff’s: “Whether or not the right constitutionally may be waived
in other circumstances—and we express no opinion here on that subject—the defendant’s initial
presence serves to assure that any waiver is indeed knowing.” Id. at 261; accord State v. Carver,
94 Idaho 677, 678 (1972) (indicating the defendant has the ability to waive his right to be present
at trial because such a waiver, either express or implied, could cure any error in proceeding with
the trial in his absence).2 The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that Crosby’s discussion of Rule

1

In fact, on the Friday before trial, the district court essentially acknowledged this rule, telling
Mr. Goff that he only needed to be present “the first time that the trial is called” and that he
could leave after that. (2019 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-13.) And yet, when Mr. Goff tried to do precisely
that on the morning of trial, the district court still concluded, contrary to the applicable legal
standards, that he had to remain present until the venire panel entered the courtroom. (Trial
Tr., p.9, Ls.6-7.)
2
As the State indicates (Resp. Br., pp.8-9), Carver, like Crosby, was dealing with the propriety
of proceeding in the defendant’s physical absence. See generally Carver, 94 Idaho 677.
However, like Crosby, Carver indicated that, despite its analysis on that particular question,
there was a separate question about whether the defendant could knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to be present. Id. at 678 (noting that a defendant’s express or implied waiver
could cure any error in proceeding with trial in his absence). That observation about the relevant
legal principles is still applicable to Mr. Goff’s case even if it was not the focus of Carver’s
application of the rules to the facts of that case.
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43 is similarly limited in scope: “Rule 43 expressly recognized only one exception to the
common-law rule,” and “we declined to conclude that the ‘drafters intended the Rule to go
further.’” United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201-02 (1995) (quoting Crosby, 506 U.S.
at 260); accord Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 200.
And yet, despite those express limitations in that regard, the State argues that Crosby and
Rule 43 should be extended to dictate the analysis with respect to Mr. Goff’s request to be absent
on the Friday before trial. (Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) It does not so much as cite Mezzanatto in
making that argument, nor does it acknowledge Crosby’s own limiting language. (See generally
Resp. Br.) As such, this Court should reject the State’s argument as being directly contrary to
the applicable Supreme Court precedent.
State v. Wachholtz, the case upon which the State primarily bases its argument in that
regard (see Resp. Br., pp.9-10), does not compel a different result. In that case, the Court of
Appeals made it clear the central question was whether the defendant was attempting to
selectively absent himself midtrial in order to disrupt the trial proceedings. State v. Wachholtz,
131 Idaho 74, 78 (Ct. App. 1998). Specifically, the defendant in that case had been ordered to
wear a stun belt during trial and the stun belt was inadvertently activated during a recess. Id. at
76. At two subsequently points during the early stages of the trial, the defendant asked to leave
the courtroom and lie down to alleviate back pains allegedly caused by, or exacerbated by, the
incident with the stun belt. Id. at 77. The prosecutor objected, arguing that the defendant was
selectively requesting to be absent in order to avoid in-court identification by the State’s
witnesses. Id.
In evaluating that issue, the Court of Appeals noted there was nothing in the record – no
observations by the district court or other evidence presented by the defendant – to show that the
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defendant was, in fact, experiencing such pains. Id. at 78. However, the “[m]ost important[]”
fact to the Court of Appeals’ analysis was the fact that “the court gave Wachholtz the choice to
rest in the holding area except when his presence was necessary for witness identification.
Wachholtz’s declination of this offer tends to substantiate the prosecutor’s suspicion that his true
motivation was to avoid in-court identification.”

Id.

Thus, the critical determination in

Wachholtz was that the defendant was trying to selectively waive his right in an effort to stall or
disrupt the trial proceedings.
The prosecutor in Mr. Goff’s case articulated no such concerns. (See generally 2019 Tr.,
Trial Tr.) In fact, the record indicates precisely the opposite – Mr. Goff wanted the trial to
proceed unhindered without him. (2019 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-8 (the district court clarifying “But you
want to proceed to jury trial in this case? You just don’t want to be here.” and Mr. Goff
responding, “Absolutely.

Yep.”)

Since Mr. Goff was not trying to selectively waive his

appearance mid-trial, 3 the legal principles at issue in Wachholtz are simply inapplicable to
Mr. Goff’s pretrial request to be absent entirely.
Rather, this case presents the question expressly left open in Crosby – whether the
defendant can knowingly waive his right to be present at trial. As discussed in detail in the
Appellant’s Brief, the answer is yes, and the district court’s refusal to allow Mr. Goff to do so
was an abuse of its discretion. (App. Br., pp.6-11.)

3

When defense counsel presented Mr. Goff’s request to be absent from the trial, defense counsel
included a caveat – that Mr. Goff did not want to be present except insofar as he might need to
testify. (2019 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-7.) However, since Mr. Goff did not have to make his choice about
whether to testify until later in the proceedings, that caveat in the pre-trial argument did not
represent an attempt to disrupt the case like in Wachholtz, where the defendant was attempting to
undercut the State’s case already in progress. As such, defense counsel’s caveat in this regard
does not change the analysis with respect to Wachholtz’s application.
6

C.

The State’s Attempt To Read Confusion Into The Record Based On A Single Statement
Analyzed In A Vacuum Is Belied By The Context From Which That Statement Was
Plucked
The State attempts to avoid the remand required by the district court’s abuse of discretion

by attempting to gin up confusion about what Mr. Goff’s position below is based on taking one
lone statement entirely out of context. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The State’s myopic focus on
that one cherry-picked statement is fatally flawed for several reasons: (1) it ignores the fact that
the statement in question was actually Mr. Goff requesting clarification about a statement made
by the district court, (2) it ignores the fact that the district court reaffirmed the full scope
Mr. Goff’s request immediately after the statement in question, and (3) it ignores the fullyrenewed request Mr. Goff subsequently made on the morning of trial.
The full record demonstrates there was no uncertainty about what Mr. Goff’s position
below was. The relevant discussion, in full, reads:
THE DEFENDANT: My mental and emotional state can’t handle being in this
county jail. I don’t want to be here. I don’t want to be here for the trial.
And it doesn’t matter if I’m here or not. You are automatically guilty if
you are accused of something like this. I already know that. So I just, I don’t
want to have anything to do with it. I don’t want to have anything to do with this
place whatsoever. It makes me sick to be here. I feel ill. I want to go back to
prison immediately.
THE COURT: One of the rights that you have is to, well, of course, meet with
your attorney and be prepared for the trial, so that he is prepared for the trial, but
you also have the right to confront the witnesses against you. If you are not
present, then you are waiving that right to confront those witnesses.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: Okay.
Also, you would have to be present for the initial start of the trial. That’s
required.

7

If you are wanting to have a jury trial, you have to be present on the first
day, the first time that the trial is called.
So at that point I would let you leave if you want to.
I mean, or you could stay. I’m not going to foreclose you.
If you get here on Monday and you say, yeah, actually I’m ready to stay,
that’s fine. But you do have to be here on Monday.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. So I can go home, go back to the prison today, come
back Monday morning, and then go back to the prison and stay there?
THE COURT: If that’s what you are wanting to do.
THE DEFENDANT: Yep.
THE COURT: That’s against your attorney’s advice. It would be against the
Court’s advice as well.
THE DEFENDANT: It doesn’t matter. This is just a circus. This is all just a
show. It doesn’t matter if I’m innocent or not.
I’ve already been convicted on the other charge and given a life sentence.
So, you know, I’m not . . .
THE COURT: But you want to proceed to jury trial in this case? You just don’t
want to be here.
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. Yep.
(2019 Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.8 (ellipsis from original).)
The full context of the exchange between Mr. Goff and the district court reveals that
Mr. Goff’s comment about coming back on Monday was a request for clarification about the
district court’s explanation about his options in light of the fact that the district court was
denying his request to be absent during the entire trial proceedings. (2019 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-23.)
Since he was only asking for clarification about the district court’s decision, that lone statement
does not change, nor create confusion about, what his request actually was. Compare Wilson v.
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 390 n.20 (Utah 2012) (quoting Mary M. v. City of Los
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Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 285 (1991) (“An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous,
adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not [invite] the error in the
ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to make the best of a bad situation
for which he was not responsible.”) (brackets from Wilson); cf. State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846,
849-50 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that, where the district court did not grant the specific relief
requested by the defendant, the invited error doctrine did not apply).
That conclusion is verified by the fact that, almost immediately after the cherry-picked
statement, the district court reaffirmed that Mr. Goff was still maintaining his initial request to be
absent from the entire trial proceedings, and Mr. Goff emphatically verified that was
“[a]bsolutely” his position.

(2019 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-8.)

As such, the full context of the

conversation between Mr. Goff and the district court demonstrates there was no backtracking
from, no confusion about, what Mr. Goff position was.
Finally, the State’s argument in this regard ignores the fact that, on the morning of trial,
Mr. Goff clearly renewed his request to be absent from the entire proceedings. (Trial Tr., p.9,
Ls.3-5; see generally Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Therefore, even if he did backtrack his request on
Friday afternoon, he retracted any sort of backtracking on the morning of trial by renewing his
original request in full. As such, the full record is clear about what Mr. Goff’s position was, just
as it is with respect to the abuse of the district court’s discretion in rejecting his request in that
regard.

D.

The State Had Failed To Argue The Proper Standard For Harmless Error, Much Less
Carry Its Burden To Prove This Error Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State’s argument for harmlessness confuses what Mr. Goff has to show in order to

demonstrate whether the procedure used by the district court was erroneous with the State’s own
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burden to prove the district court’s actual use of that erroneous procedure in this case was
harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) In order to show the district court erred by adopting a
particular procedure, “the question must be not whether jurors actually articulated a
consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but rather whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play’” as a result of the procedure used by the district court.
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505
(1976)). The United States Supreme Court has subsequently and repeatedly recognized that the
prejudicial effects of such procedures will often have negative effects that “‘cannot be shown
from a trial transcript.’” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992)).
Mr. Goff demonstrated that the procedure the district court used in this case – requiring
Mr. Goff to be present when the venire entered and immediately allowing him to leave the court
room – carried the requisite “unacceptable risk” because there was a substantial risk that
procedure would reveal Mr. Goff’s custodial status to the venire panel. (App. Br., pp.12-14.)
The State’s response – that the transcript does not affirmatively show several of those potential
prejudice forms playing out in this case (Resp. Br., pp.12-13) – completely disregards Deck and
Riggins in that regard. In fact, the State does not so much as cite either of those precedents
directly on point. (See generally Resp. Br.) As Deck and Riggins make clear, the fact that
certain forms of potential prejudice are not expressly apparent from the transcript in this case
does not defeat the argument that the procedure in question was not error.
The State’s argument about invited error is similarly flawed. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)
The act in question is whether the district court’s procedure of having Mr. Goff be present when
the venire panel entered the courtroom was erroneous. Mr. Goff did not, as demonstrated by the
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exchange with the district court supra, encourage the district court to adopt this procedure.
Therefore, the error in using that procedure was not invited. See, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho 826, 834 (2010) (explaining that an error is only invited if “the error in question was
encouraged or requested by a party”). The fact Mr. Goff made the prejudicial statement during
the use of that improper procedure does not change that conclusion or show that the use of the
improper procedure was not prejudicial, any more than a defendant giving consent to search
during an impermissibly coercive situation would mean the improper coercion was not
prejudicial. 4 Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit observed, such incidents only reaffirm why the use
of the procedure in question was erroneous and prejudicial: “[I]t seems absurd to require the
court to bring a combative defendant into the presence of prospective jurors, only to taint the
pool with his own disruptive behavior.” United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 236 (11th Cir.
2013).
Since the use of that procedure was erroneous, since it carried the unacceptable risk of
prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the preserved error in that regard was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1137
(2020); accord State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). However, the State did not articulate,
much less attempt to carry its burden in that regard. (See generally Resp. Br.) As such, it has
waived that issue, and thus, failed to carry that burden. Compare State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 598-99 (2013) (“the State never specifically argues that [the error] did not ‘contribute to the
verdict obtained’ as clearly required under Perry. . . . As such, the State has failed to meet its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that” the error was harmless); Zichko, 129 Idaho at

4

And even if this Court were to not consider the impact of Mr. Goff’s statement, that would not
mean the procedure was not problematic because of the other unacceptable risks under Deck and
Holbrook discussed supra.
11

263 (requiring a party present both argument and authority on an issue). Therefore, as in
Almaraz, this Court should remand the case in light of the district court’s error. See also
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (“When the discretion exercised by a trial
court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and
remand the case for appropriate findings.”).
At any rate, the State could not have carried its burden to prove the error in this case
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The question in that regard is whether the erroneous use of
that procedure had a probative impact on the jury’s deliberations alongside the other evidence
presented in this case. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39 (2020); see also, e.g., Holbrook, 475 U.S. at
570. The record in this case actually shows the procedure caused the jurors to learn about
Mr. Goff’s custody status, and there is a reasonable concern that knowledge affected the jurors’
deliberations. (See App. Br., pp.12-14.)
Moreover, the fact that the district court instructed the jury in the preliminary instructions
about Mr. Goff’s absence does not, ipso facto, make this error harmless. (See App. Br., pp.1415.) The only point the State made in that regard was to reiterate that there is a presumption that
the jurors will follow a court’s instruction. (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) However, it offered no
argument as to explain why that presumption applies in this case.

(See generally Resp.

Br., pp.12-13.) That is particularly problematic for the State because, as Mr. Goff pointed out,
the United States Supreme Court specifically disavowed that sort of blind reliance on that
presumption in cases such as this, where the issue is only addressed in the pre-proof instructions.
(App. Br., pp.14-15 (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568 (“‘[O]ur faith in the adversary system
and in jurors’ capacity to adhere to the trial judge’s instructions has never been absolute.’”).)
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Again, this demonstrates that the State failed to carry its burden under the proper harmless error
analysis, and this Court should grant Mr. Goff relief as a result.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Goff respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for a
new trial.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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